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Abstract – The gas system in Europe is facing increasing unpredictability due to the interactions with the 
electricity generation system. Indeed, gas fired power plants make up an important back-up technology to deal 
with intermittency induced by wind-power integration. Therefore, the flexibility needs with respect to 
unpredictable power generation are actually transferred to the gas market. Applying the well-known electric 
power generation concepts of ‘unit commitment’ and ‘dispatching’ to the gas market, a hypothetical gas-
transmission system has been modeled to verify, first, the physical impact of wind power forecasting errors on 
the gas system, and, second, its effect on the organization of gas-imbalance settlement for non-market-based 
and market-based design options. Increasing unpredictability leads to more expensive physical balancing of 
the gas system. These costs should be borne as much as possible by those effectively causing them. From a 
regulatory point of view in the European context, cost recovery by means of non-market-based settlement 
faces the problem of defining an appropriate cost-neutral penalty that covers the balancing costs and 
incentivizes shippers. Market-based settlement relates the variable imbalance tariffs to the actual system 
imbalance and thus any factor that strongly impacts on the system state like unpredictability. However, this 
mechanism raises imbalance-settlement tariffs for all unbalanced gas network users, even if the major source 
of unpredictability is a clearly identifiable shipper.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The gas system and electricity-generation system are interacting due to the use of gas-fired power plants, but 
also more and more because these plants are used to balance the electricity system. This interaction is 
expected to further increase in the future. The gas system, then, has to deal with this changing context: gas is 
storable, but physical and organizational challenges remain present in the balancing of the gas network. This 
paper discusses this overlooked problem in the literature on gas regulation, which is of particular interest in 
Europe today, and even more so in the next decades, because the organization of gas balancing is still under 
much debate. The main research question is how this new kind of unpredictability in the gas system interacts 
with possible organizational designs of a gas-balancing mechanism in the European context. Towards this 
aim, the physical impact of balancing with gas is looked at in a conceptual case study that presupposes the 
balancing of wind-power output by gas-fired power, disregarding and thus excluding other balancing tools in 
the electricity-generation system. By using an operations research model, the physical impact on the gas 
system is simulated and the associated costs are calculated. Finally, these costs have to be passed on to 
unbalanced shippers. Note that the case study is conceptual and that the conclusions are therefore qualitative, 
and are not relating to a particular existing energy system. 
 
The investigated problem basically originates in the large-scale introduction of renewable-energy sources 
(RES) in the electricity system. The roll-out of these RES affects the electricity-generation system [1] and 
required grid [2], but also have an impact on the role of other energy carriers such as natural gas (which can 
accommodate this RES roll-out). Wind power has an intermittent character, meaning the output is variable 
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and to some extent unpredictable [3]. Furthermore, wind power has zero marginal costs and as such replaces 
other, dispatchable electric power plants in the dispatching order when generating [4, 5]. Thus, electricity 
balancing tools are required to deal with this wind-power intermittency [1]. Possible balancing tools consist of 
pump-hydro storages, demand-side responsiveness and flexibly dispatchable conventional power plants, such 
as gas-fired electric power generation (GFPP). Lower investment cost, favorable CO2-emission 
characteristics, flexible operability and a relatively short lead time between final investment decision and 
actual operation of a plant make, e.g., open-cycle gas turbines (OCGT) and combined-cycle gas turbines 
(CCGT) attractive technology [6-9].1 Current high fuel prices in Europe represent a downside of GFPP 
technology, but the worldwide development of shale gas and the LNG market may change this. Furthermore, 
the inclusion of CO2 prices improves the relative fuel cost compared to, e.g., coal-fired electric power plants.  
 
As an example, Figure 1 shows the day-ahead forecast of wind power, together with the actual wind-power 
output for the year 2012 for the Belgian system, which has approximately 1000 MW installed wind-power 
capacity, to illustrate both the variable and unpredictable character. 
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Figure 1. (a) Wind-power output and (b) wind-power-forecast error, for the period May 1, 2012 – April 
30, 2013, for Belgium. A positive forecast error indicates an overestimation (forecast higher than actual 
value), whereas a negative error indicates an underestimation (forecast lower than actual output). Data 
obtained from Elia [10]. 
 
When gas-fired power plants are used for balancing, the flexibility needs of the electricity-generation system 
are (partly) transferred to the gas system, imposing a need to allocate system-flexibility costs to the users 
thereof. Gas-Balancing-responsible shippers can rely on the ex-post balancing services provided by the gas 
TSO (transmission-system operator) or they can take measures to contract ex-ante flexibility services [11]. 
Pivotal to this choice are the gas-balancing rules that have to allocate the system costs to the unbalanced 
party, on the one hand; and incentivize shippers to balance beforehand, on the other hand. The addition of 
 
1
 Open-cycle gas turbines (OCGT) are actually providing more dispatching flexibility as that technology allows even 
higher ramping rates than CCGTs. However, for the conceptual analysis in this paper, CCGTs have been chosen 
arbitrarily as the considered GFPP technology. 
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wind power and its interaction with mainly GFPPs changes the gas-demand characteristics. It will be 
demonstrated that some current balancing-mechanism designs become impractical (and on the long term 
perhaps unsustainable) to deal with this changing gas demand. 
 
The role of gas and wind in the power-generation mix has been underlined many times in the literature on the 
operation of electricity systems. Delarue et al. [12] have demonstrated that for electricity systems with a 
diverse generation mix, wind power mainly interacts with GFPPs. The Spanish electricity system with its 
massive amount of wind power has been shown to strongly rely on CCGT-related flexibility to deal with 
rising electricity-generation volatility [13]. The expected impact of large-scale wind-power integration on the 
UK gas network has been found to come down to more CCGTs operated in a flexible way and results in 
substantial line-pack swings, more gas-compression-power consumption and more overall gas use for electric 
power generation [14]. Furthermore, concerns are raised in that study by Qadrdan et al. [14] regarding very 
rapid depletion of the line-pack buffer if the “wrong” circumstances occur: a combination of low wind-power 
output, peak electrical gas demand and peak non-electrical gas demand. In a way, massive wind power is 
crowding out other electricity-generation technologies in favor of more flexible gas in terms of new capacity 
added (MW). Moreover, long stretches of cold weather, and thus high heating demand, often coincide with 
periods of low wind speeds. The effective number of operating hours of CCGTs, and thus the number of 
MWh produced per year , on the other hand, is said to rise by some studies, e.g., [8], whereas other studies 
argue the effective running hours of CCGTs, or GFPPs in general, will go down, e.g., [9]. Nevertheless, gas’ 
qualification as “fuel of consequence” seems justified.  
 
Concerns about the changing interactions between gas and electricity have also been raised before in the 
literature. Hallack [15] extensively discusses the changing needs of the gas network imposed by the new 
demand characteristics of increasing gas-fired electric power. In the new gas market, short-term flexibility, 
exchangeability and storability (for short periods) are the keywords and the regulatory framework for gas-
infrastructure development has to respond to these needs. The French regulator also has raised concerns about 
the surge of GFPPs, especially in the field of daily balancing of the gas loads [16, 17]. Indeed, the balancing 
of gas supply and demand on an hourly and daily basis becomes more challenging because the flexible 
dispatching of GFPPs coincides with strongly varying gas needs: when ramping up a CCGT, gas withdrawal 
soars instantly, whereas the ramping down requires gas flows to drop almost instantly. Evidently, the 
management of pressure in the pipelines can deliver the needed flexibility. Yet, pipeline-based flexibility is 
limited in volume and can only be used for short-term storage [11]. The deployment of line-pack flexibility is 
not limited to a specific kind of gas demand, but evidence from the UK suggests that flexible CCGTs cause 
higher swings in the line pack, defined as the amplitude between the maximal and minimal line-pack level 
over a gas day, than the residential sector [11, 18, 19]. This was not perceived as very troublesome because 
the share of electric power generation in the European gas demand has been relatively low. Germany, Italy 
and Spain, however, show a remarkable growth of gas consumption in the electric power sector over the last 
decade [20, 21]. Although smaller in absolute numbers, a similar trend can be observed in the other European 
countries as well, the exception being the UK, which remained more or less stable because its “dash for gas” 
already started in the late 80s and early 90s [22]. Moreover, power generation is projected to remain the main 
driver of growth in future (European) gas demand [6, 7]. Consequently, the short-term gas-flexibility needs of 
the electric power sector will become a significant issue. 
 
The regulation of gas balancing has mostly been studied in the industry literature in Europe. The regulators 
have published viewpoint papers, consultation papers and framework guidelines on how to organize 
settlement of imbalances [23-28]. The transmission-system operators and shippers have also contributed to the 
debate [29-34]. The main outcome of this debate regarding settlement design comes down to applying market-
based settlement and to have cost-neutral imbalances tariffs that just pass on the TSO’s effective balancing 
costs to unbalanced shippers. However, in practice, most balancing is still non-market based, as indicated by 
KEMA [35]. The organization of balancing has further been discussed by Lapuerta [36] concerning the time 
interval over which balancing should occur. In that work it is said that a daily balancing interval is not 
increasing security risks for the gas-flow programs at that time in the UK. The contributions in the academic 
literature to the balancing debate are limited. There are two reasons for this: first, the organization of 
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balancing became an issue only after the liberalization and unbundling; second, the problem is specific to the 
European institutional context. Indeed, in Europe, the gas network is organized as a zone consisting of 
multiple connected pipelines. In that zone, time and geographical flexibility are offered on a non-
discriminatory basis, meaning that flexibility is bundled and (partly) socialized. Hence, the regulation and 
organization of gas balancing should be investigated. Especially, in a gas market that is evolving rapidly 
because of the above mentioned environmental, technical and economic challenges. 
 
This paper, then, looks at a particular problem of gas balancing: the challenges of a new kind of 
unpredictability that is transferred from the electricity-generation system. The effect of wind-power 
intermittency on the (isolated) electricity system has been studied extensively, e.g., [37-40], but the impact of 
integration of these intermittent RES on the load balancing of the gas system, or any other interacting energy 
system, is less or not studied. The impact on the gas system is twofold: a physical impact, which has been 
identified by Qadrdan et al. [14], and a regulatory or organizational impact, which has not been studied before 
to the best of our knowledge, and which is the core subject of this paper. Indeed, the economic settlement of 
the physical and contractual imbalances poses a regulatory challenge that can be dealt with either according to 
a market-based mechanism or according to a non-market-based mechanism. Both organizational options will 
be examined below for increasing unpredictability of gas demand, applying the electricity-generation concepts 
“unit commitment” and “power dispatching” to the gas system. The former concept deals with the planning of 
the power plants before real time with imperfect information, whereas the latter refers to the actual use of 
power plants in the real time when more information has become available. These concepts are then translated 
into a gas commitment, meaning an amount of gas that is planned to be used, and gas dispatching, meaning 
the actual amount of gas that is required to meet demand. 
 
The paper is further organized as follows. The methodology and assumptions of the case study are discussed 
in the subsequent section. Section 3 presents the results on the physical impact on gas balancing in the 
assumed gas system. The organization of gas-imbalance settlement and its response to the rising 
unpredictability is discussed in section 4. The main findings and conclusions are then summarized and 
discussed in a final section. 
 
2. Conceptual case study: description of methodology and assumptions 
 
To study the conceptual impact of wind-power unpredictability (forecast errors) on the balancing of the gas 
network, a simplified hypothetical electricity and gas system is considered with wind participation levels 
between 15 and 25 percent of generated electricity. An example of an applied case study on the operational 
impact of massive wind-power integration in the (predicted) future UK system can be found in [14]. In that 
study by Qadrdan et al., it is shown that gas-network operations and the electricity-generation mix are affected 
by the interactions between wind and gas for electric power generation. The conceptual study in this paper 
looks beyond that operational impact, and focuses on the impact of wind-power unpredictability on the 
(design of) gas-balancing mechanism. 
 
An operations research model, GASFLEX [41], is used to simulate the gas system with regard to its physical 
impact due to shipper imbalances and the costs associated with this imbalance. This hypothetical gas system 
is discussed in more detail in section 2.2. The unpredictability is introduced as five deterministic scenarios 
with regard to the electricity produced by GFPPs. To this end, a hypothetical electricity system has been 
simulated with the MILP-OPEG model by Delarue [42] taking into account a forecast error. This is further 
explained in subsection 2.1. We do note that the electricity system is simplified and tailored to the needs of 
the problem under investigation, which is the gas system. Therefore, the electricity related data below are to 
be considered input for the simulation of the gas system. Finally, subsection 2.3 summarizes the complete 
problem statement. 
 
2.1 Electricity-system input for gas system: assumptions and data 
The assumed electricity-generation system consists of 600 MW wind power in a single wind farm and four 
CCGT plants of 400 MW each. All CCGT plants are identical with respect to their characteristics, e.g., for 
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minimum uptimes and downtimes and efficiency rates at different working points.2 No electrical network is 
taken into account, as the relevant object of study is the gas system and the effects of the production of 
electric power on it. For this same reason, this very simple two-technology electricity-generation system is 
sufficient. 
 
A scaled generic electricity-demand profile for a typical day in Northwest Europe serves as the exogenous 
input for the power-plant unit-commitment and power-dispatching optimization [42]. The average electric-
power demand amounts to 1370 MW with a fairly limited variability of the power-demand profile as 
measured by its standard deviation of 118.8 MW. Wind power is then taken into account by subtracting it 
from the considered electricity-demand profile, which gives the net electric power demand to be met by 
CCGTs. The unpredictable fluctuations of wind power are accounted for by imposing four deterministic 
wind-power forecast-error profiles on the real-time wind-power output profile, which is the same in all 
examined cases.3 In other words, the variability of wind is the same in all cases and is rather small; hence, the 
wind-power profile is rather flat in the perfect-forecast case. The differences between profiles depend on the 
unpredictable fluctuations. It is the effect of these fluctuations on the gas-system balancing that is of interest 
in this study. Additionally, a no-wind scenario serves as benchmark to understand the flexibility needs with 
and without wind. With reference to the electric power demand, demand-side uncertainty is disregarded to 
simplify the analysis. The 0 MW-wind scenario should therefore return similar outcomes to the perfect-
forecast scenario because in both scenarios wind is equally reliable as gas at the supply side. All remaining 
differences between the perfect-forecast case and the no-wind case, e.g., with regard to intra-day flexibility, 
can be attributed to differences in variability.  
 
Table 1. Summary of examined wind-power scenarios based on different forecast errors for wind-
power output and a benchmark scenario with no wind: µ represents the average, and σ the standard 
deviation, of predicted electric power generation by CCGTs 
Scenario Description µ [MW] σ [MW] 
perfect forecast wind-power output is predicted perfectly 
and dispatching follows unit commitment 
1100 106.4 
small errors small prediction errors require some 
corrective dispatching decisions 
1099 98.44 
overestimation actual wind-power output much less than 
predicted and more CCGT power needs to 
be dispatched 
1063 194.9 
underestimation actual wind power output exceeds 
predictions requiring CCGTs to be 
regulated down 
1141 99.86 
no wind benchmark with zero wind-power output 1370 118.8 
 
Table 1 provides an overview of the wind-power scenarios that are examined. The average predicted electric 
power to be generated by CCGTs and the variability of the predicted gas-fired electric power generation are 
reported under µ (MW) and σ (MW), respectively.  
 
Table 2, then, summarizes the average and the standard deviation of the wind-power prediction errors for the 
four forecast scenarios. E.g., in the overestimation case, 37 MW of predicted wind power was not actually 
available during the dispatching phase. Note that the errors should be compared to the 600 MW of installed 
wind-power capacity. 
 
 
2
 A priority rule is applied whenever multiple optimal dispatching solutions exist: in that case plants could be substituted 
at zero cost and the obtained solution would otherwise depend on the solution path of the algorithm. 
3
 Wind power profiles are derived from wind-power data published by the Belgian electricity-transmission-system 
operator, Elia [43], and prediction errors have been generated according to the method introduced by Brand en Kok [44] 
and have been calibrated on historical forecast and real-time wind-speed data of the Royal Dutch Meteorological Institute 
[45]. 
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Table 2. Summary of wind-power prediction statistics for the four scenarios: mean prediction error 
[MW] and standard deviation of the prediction error [MW] for 600 MW installed wind-power 
capacity; actual output compared to predicted output 
Scenario Mean prediction error [MW] St.dev. prediction error [MW] 
perfect forecast 0 0 
small errors -1.5 16.7 
overestimation -37 107 
underestimation 40 31.4 
 
Note that the naming of the research cases refers to the wind-power forecast: the underestimation case 
underestimates wind (too little wind output predicted), but coincides with overestimating gas demand (too 
much gas committed). 
 
Figure 2 plots the total electricity demand and the forecasted residual gas-fired electric power demand in the 
upper panel, whereas in the lower panel the wind-power forecasts are illustrated.  
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Figure 2. Electric power profiles – a) forecasted residual demand for electric power generation by 
CCGTs and b) wind-power-output forecasts for different forecast qualities; total electric power 
demand is represented in the upper panel by the black line 
 
The average predicted wind-power output is obtained by subtracting the average predicted CCGT production 
(represented by “µ” in Table 1) from the average electric power demand (1370 MW). It varies between 
approximately 230 MW or about 17 percent of the average electric-power demand, and 310 MW or 22 
percent of the average electric-power demand. The large standard deviation (“σ” in Table 1) for the scenario 
with overestimated wind power (third scenario in Table 1) indicates a forecast with much more variable wind 
power than will actually occur in real time. 
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During the first 8 hours, for instance, much more wind-power output is predicted than actual wind output will 
be, as can be observed in the difference between the overestimation case and the perfect-forecast case. 
Furthermore, the electric-power-demand profile and the no-wind profile provide the same information, hence 
their overlap in Figure 2.a.  
 
For the optimization details, we refer explicitly to the original work by Delarue [42], in which the operation of 
power plants is optimized in a two-step process. In the first step, a unit-commitment (UC) problem is solved 
for the electricity-generation system based on the forecasted wind power and the resulting net demand for gas-
fired power generation. The second part of the optimization deals with the actual economic power dispatching 
(PD) of the CCGTs based on the actual hourly wind-power output and the CCGT costs. 
 
In order to investigate the flexibility of the gas network, the hourly electric power production of the CCGTs 
(MW) is translated into an hourly gas-flow rate (expressed in million cubic meters per hour, M.m3) by using 
the power plant’s efficiency rate and an assumed gross caloric value (GCV) of 0.0115 MWh/m3
 
for gas. The 
output of this electricity-generation optimization is now used as input for the gas-system optimizations that 
are discussed in the subsequent section. 
 
2.2 Hypothetical gas system: assumptions and data 
The hypothetical gas-pipeline system, illustrated in Figure 3, consists of five demand nodes divided over four 
CCGT plants and one industrial consumer. Next, gas enters the network through two production/import 
nodes, supply A and supply B, and one storage site can be used to inject and withdraw gas. The nodes are 
connected by seven pipelines without gas compression (thus, compression occurs outside the modeled 
system). Pipelines are defined in forward direction, but can allow backward flow. In Figure 3, for instance, the 
flow on line CCGT2 – storage physically flows from the storage to CCGT2, hence the negative sign. 
Furthermore, the figure illustrates supply and demand (bold, M.m3/h) and pipeline inflow and outflow rates 
(italic, M.m3/h) for the 6th hour of the overestimation case. All supply from node B (0.0875) is injected in line 
B – CCGT3 (0.0875), but less gas is taken from the line (0.0771). As a result, the line-pack buffer of that 
pipeline is loaded. Part of the gas is used to meet local demand of CCGT3, whereas the remaining gas is 
injected on the connecting pipelines industry – CCGT3 and CCGT3 – CCGT4. Other numbers and nodal and 
line balances are explained similarly. More technical details (e.g., pressure limits and pipeline geometry) are 
provided in an Appendix. Details on the modeling can be found in [41], but the main principles are discussed 
below. 
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Figure 3. Gas network with 2 gas-supply nodes (o), 1 storage node (◊), 1 industrial-demand (*) node 
and 4 CCGT-demand nodes () – numbers [M.m3/h] for the 6th hour of the overestimation case, italic 
numbers represent flows in and out of a pipeline with negative numbers indicating backward flow, 
numbers in bold indicate supply and demand (including storage) 
 
As explained by Keyaerts et al. [11], the pipeline capacity offers time-flexibility services at the cost of 
reducing transport services. In other words, capacity must be designed taking into account a peak-flow service 
and a peak-flexibility service. The connecting pipelines in our hypothetical gas system, therefore, have been 
defined in terms of pressure limits and diameter in such a way that the pipeline capacity does not limit the 
flow rates demanded by the CCGTs.  
 
The line-pack flexibility provides time flexibility (contrasted with geographic flexibility) to the TSO, the kind 
of flexibility needed to deal with sudden changes like intermittent gas demand. 4 This pipeline storage is 
expressed in M.m3. Underground storage makes up a second source of system flexibility in the hypothetical 
gas system. Balance between injection, withdrawal and storage level has to be maintained over time. 
 
On the shippers’ side, the gas-supply contract is assumed not to provide intra-day modulation and other ex-
ante flexibility is disregarded to focus on ex-post balancing. As a consequence of these assumptions, all 
flexibility to deal with unpredictable fluctuations has to come from the TSO. And the shipper optimization 
can only use ex-post flexibility to modulate supply to match (predicted) demand. 
 
A flow-balance equation ensures that all gas entering the system (supply, withdrawal from storage or 
depletion of line pack) equals the gas leaving the system (demand, injection in storage, buffering as line 
pack). The objective of the model is to minimize the total system-balancing costs. To this end, an operational 
cost of 0.01 EUR/m3 has been considered with regard to pipeline storage and 0.05 EUR/m3 for traditional 
storage. These costs have been based on flexibility cost data published by the Dutch TSO [46]. 
 
The optimization with GASFLEX is first conducted for the committed CCGT plants in every hour based on 
the wind-power prediction (this is the gas “unit commitment”). Subsequently, the actual hourly gas dispatch is 
optimized taking into account wind-forecast inaccuracies for the CCGT gas demand (the gas “power 
dispatching”). In that second phase, the gas supply at the import nodes is fixed at the flat levels committed in 
 
4
 Geographic flexibility refers to routing options for gas: gas molecules are homogenous and the network operator will 
optimize gas flows independent of shipper nominations. Therefore, shippers can enter gas in one part of the gas system to 
take it off in another part of the system and they can change these locations according to their needs, within the physical 
constraints of the gas system. Time flexibility, on the other hand, allows gas entering at time t to be used at time t+x. 
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the UC. Indeed, this supply fixing simulates the unpredictability of gas demand that is dependent on the wind-
power forecast error. Therefore, the obtained imbalances can be considered exogenous to the dispatching 
phase. It is possible to consider re-nominations to some extent, e.g., up to two hours before real time, as better 
short-term wind-speed forecasts become available. Such an approach lowers the financial balancing needs if a 
shipper can use ex-ante flexibility on short notice. However, this option has not been implemented here 
because the fundamental dynamics would not change. It is important to understand that when, e.g., storage is 
used as ex-ante flexibility, the contractual flows (rights to gas) and the physical injection or withdrawal are 
separate matters with different actors responsible for either of them. In fact, only the net storage flow has to 
be physically injected or withdrawn by the end of the day. 
 
2.3 Problem setting: further details 
The hypothetical problem setting further consist of two shippers of about equal size in total demand over the 
horizon: a shipper with just CCGTs in his demand portfolio, hereafter “wind shipper”, and a shipper with an 
industrial-demand profile, hereafter “historic shipper”. With regard to the physical balancing of the system, 
the TSO has access to line-pack flexibility and underground storage.  
 
Balancing costs have to be recovered from unbalanced shippers through the settlement mechanism. Two 
distinct design options are examined: a non-market-based mechanism and a market-based mechanism. The 
former stands for a design in which an imbalance is cashed out at a price that is determined disregarding the 
imbalance position of the gas system. By definition, for non-market-based settlement, the imbalance fee (Fimb) 
is independent of the system imbalance (imbsys): 
0imb
sys
F
imb
∂
=
∂
 (1) 
 
A market-based mechanism, on the other hand, implicitly or explicitly links the imbalance fee to the system 
imbalance or the TSO’s deployment of flexible gas as expressed by the non-zero derivative of the imbalance 
tariff to the system imbalance in Eq. (2): 
0imb
sys
F
imb
∂
≠
∂
 (2) 
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Figure 4. Merit-order curve for system flexibility for five wind-power scenarios when the historic 
shipper is short: upward (downward) regulation to correct gas-system deficit (surplus), the system-
imbalance lines determine the effective marginal cost of system flexibility; the “no-wind” and “perfect-
forecast” lines overlap 
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Figure 4 illustrates the dynamics behind this market-based settlement of ex-post-balancing services. The TSO 
can dispatch an amount of upward or downward flexibility to correct for a gas system in deficit or in surplus, 
respectively. The sources of flexibility are ranked according to their marginal costs and the cheapest sources 
are used first. Only if additional flexibility is required, more expensive flexible gas is used. The imbalance 
tariff per unit of imbalance, then, can be related to the system imbalance and the cost of the marginal unit of 
system flexibility. In Figure 4, the gas reference price is assumed to be 0.25 EUR/m3. An operational cost for 
flexibility (supra) has to be added to, or subtracted from the reference price, e.g., the day-ahead price, for gas 
to obtain the marginal cost of flexible gas. 
 
However, the merit-order curve is dependent on the actual gas-system operation because availability and 
dispatching of line-pack flexibility is only determined dynamically within GASFLEX. Therefore, Figure 4 
only shows one possible merit curve that is obtained from the optimization. The dynamic limit for upward 
line-pack flexibility amounted to approximately 0.17 M.m3 or about 50 percent of total hourly demand or 2 
percent of total daily demand. Furthermore, Figure 4 shows the gas-system imbalances for the five examined 
cases from Table 1. The lines indicating the no-wind and the perfect-forecast cases coincide almost perfectly 
because the wind-power output is perfectly predicted in the UC stage in both cases and the remaining intra-
day variability is small and very similar. Note that line-pack flexibility has been included in the merit order; 
whereas in practice, line-pack flexibility is must-use flexibility that is subtracted from the TSO demand for 
flexibility to obtain the residual demand for flexible gas that has to be procured from balancing-services 
providers. A single reference price is assumed for all actors, disregarding the strategic use of the balancing 
mechanism by shippers to, e.g., dump cheap gas from long-term contracts capitalizing on a large reference-
price difference.5 
 
Ultimately, only four situations can occur for end-of-period imbalance settlement (Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Settlement mechanism: four distinct quadrants according to individual shipper imbalance and 
system imbalance 
Shipper imbalance System imbalance 
 Short Long 
Short Q1 Q3 
Long Q2 Q4 
 
First, an individual shipper can be short when the system is also short (Q1 in Table 3). In that case the shipper 
is instigating the system imbalance. Another shipper can be long when the system is short (Q2 in Table 3). 
That shipper actually mitigates the system imbalance When the system is long, short shippers will be settled 
according to Q3. Finally, Q4 represents the applicable imbalance tariff for long shippers in a long system. 
Each quadrant, thus, represents a system-shipper combination with a distinctive imbalance tariff. However, 
most currently applied settlement mechanisms have no connection between the system position and the 
applicable tariff, using the same for both situations (Q1 = Q3 and Q2 = Q4).  
 
Several options exist to determine tariffs from the merit-order curve and the system imbalance. The most 
basic example consists in using the price coinciding with the used amount of balancing energy for both long 
and short shippers. The underestimation case in Figure 4, for instance, has a marginal cost of 0.24 EUR/m3 for 
system flexibility (or net cost of 0.01 EUR/m3 when the reference price of gas is taken into account. This kind 
of tariff system rewards shippers that help the system with a mitigating opposing imbalance position, whereas 
it penalizes shippers who further instigate the system imbalance. 
 
 
5
 If the shipper’s contract price amounts to 0.18 EUR/m3 and the balancing reference price is 0.25 EUR/m3, the shipper 
can dump gas in the balancing mechanism even taking into account net imbalance charges of, e.g., 20 %; this is especially 
true for non-market-based balancing because the charges are in that case independent from the state of the system. 
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So, market-based settlement depends on an implicit or explicit merit-order curve for flexible gas. The merit-
order-derived marginal cost of balancing, then, provides better signals to the market players with reference to 
the real costs of flexibility and the need for further investment in these instruments. A non-market-based 
tariff, on the other hand, does not take into account the overall state of the gas system and the actually used 
flexibility. Therefore, this settlement design does not provide efficient signals. 
 
Actual settlement mechanisms can become very complex. The subsequent analysis of wind-power 
unpredictability on gas balancing does not include complex settlement designs, but rather uses basic 
settlement designs to understand the fundamental principles. The main findings, though, remain valid for 
more complex designs because the latter are just combinations of the basic design options that are examined. 
 
3. Effects of wind unpredictability on gas balancing 
 
The impact assessment of wind-power unpredictability on gas balancing is split in two parts. The first 
subsection deals with the impact of unpredictability on the physical flexibility requirements of the gas system. 
The cost recovery by means of the settlement mechanism is subject of a second subsection.  
 
3.1 Physical gas balancing 
Because of prediction errors, the wind shipper commits too much or too little gas during the UC, resulting in 
unavoidable imbalances in the dispatching phase. This wind-shipper imbalance is combined with the 
imbalance of the historic shipper, for whom both negative and positive forecast errors have been assumed. 
The TSO, then, anticipates the (intra-day) flexibility needs based on the information received during the UC, 
e.g., building up a buffer when shippers expect to be short during the day. 
 
a. Historic shipper: short imbalance position 
Table 4 gives an overview of the dispatched flexibility on a net daily basis (end-of-day flexibility). Note that 
negative numbers indicate that gas is withdrawn from the line-pack or the storage (upward flexibility), 
whereas positive numbers indicate an increase of the buffered gas in the pipeline or in the underground 
storage. 
 
Table 4. Dispatching of flexibility (daily net amount M.m3) assuming a short historic shipper; positive: 
line-pack buffer / storage inflates; negative: line-pack buffer / storage decreases 
 
Perfect 
forecast 
Small 
error 
Over-
estimation 
Under-
estimation No wind 
Line pack 
[M.m3] 
-0.091 -0.097 -0.176 0.061 -0.091 
Storage [M.m3] 0 0 -0.054 0 0 
 
If insufficient gas is supplied because forecasts indicated low gas demand, the buffers are called upon to 
provide flexibility. This is the case for the first three forecast scenarios and the no-wind scenario of Table 4. 
The underestimation case (column 4 in Table 4), on the other hand, results in a net surplus of gas because the 
wind-shipper surplus exceeds the deficit of the historic shipper. In this scenario, the opposing imbalance 
positions actually help the overall system.  
The net system-balancing costs are displayed in Figure 5. These net balancing cost are obtained by 
multiplying all used flexibility (related to maximum intra-day swing) with its respective variable cost. 
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Figure 5. System-balancing costs for one gas day (short historic shipper) – total costs are made up of 
intra-day balancing costs and end-of-day balancing costs; end-of-day costs are attributed to the 
unbalanced shippers, but intra-day costs are typically recovered outside the settlement mechanism, the 
relative division between the two cost-types depends on the variability and unpredictability of demand 
 
The balancing costs are more or less equal for all cases, except for the overestimation scenario, which has 
higher costs due to the dispatching of more expensive flexibility (see the merit order in Figure 4 for cost data 
and Table 4 for dispatching of flexibility). The balancing costs, then, are further broken down into “end-of-
day costs” and “intra-day costs”. The former represent the costs of the end-of-day system imbalance, meaning 
the costs that can be associated with unpredictability of gas demand. If shippers can predict demand perfectly, 
these costs would be avoided. The intra-day costs, on the other hand, reflect the flexibility that is used to 
cover temporary imbalances that are corrected by the aggregated shippers before the end of the balancing 
period. Indeed, shippers can, e.g., inject gas in the line-pack buffer during the night to use it during the 
morning. As such, these costs relate to the variable nature of the gas demand and the inherent mismatch 
between demand and supply in the shipper portfolio. The difference between the perfect-forecast case and the 
no-wind case entirely comes down to differences in variability as the end-of-day system imbalances are equal. 
Whether the intra-day costs or the end-of-day costs are dominant, depends entirely on the time patterns of 
supply and demand and the ex-ante flexibility in the portfolio of the shipper. In the end, both costs are 
transferred to the shippers either as balancing charges for unbalanced shippers or partly socialized in the 
tariffs for all shippers. 
 
b. Historic shipper: long imbalance position 
Similarly, Figure 6 reports the net balancing costs for an example in which the historic shipper overshoots 
actual demand and commits too much gas, resulting in a long imbalance position.  
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Figure 6. System-balancing costs for one gas day (historic shipper is long) – total costs are made up of 
intra-day balancing costs and end-of-day balancing costs; end-of-day costs are attributed to the 
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unbalanced shippers, but intra-day costs are typically recovered outside the settlement mechanism, the 
division between the two cost-types depends on the variability and unpredictability of demand 
 
This time, the balancing costs of overestimating wind are not problematic because the opposing imbalance 
positions reduce the overall system imbalance, avoiding the dispatching of expensive flexible gas. The costs 
of balancing when the wind power is underestimated, on the other hand, have exploded because both shippers 
have committed too much gas, resulting in the injection of gas into more expensive underground storage 
(Table 5). In the other scenarios, the line-pack buffer provided sufficient flexibility to ensure gas-system 
integrity. 
 
Table 5. Dispatching of flexibility (daily net amount M.m3) assuming a long historic shipper; positive: 
line-pack buffer / storage rises; negative: line-pack buffer / storage decreases 
 
Perfect 
forecast 
Small 
error 
Over-
estimation 
Under-
estimation No wind 
Line pack 
[M.m3] 
0.091 0.085 -0.047 0.110 0.091 
Storage [M.m3] 0 0 0 0.133 0 
 
Figure 7 shows the dynamically obtained merit order for the cases with a surplus for the historic shipper. The 
higher marginal costs of flexible gas in the underestimation case can be observed on the left-hand side. Note 
that system imbalances are long in four of the five cases because the historic shipper is now long. 
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Figure 7. Merit-order curve for system flexibility (historic shipper is long): upward (downward) 
regulation to correct gas system deficit (surplus), the system-imbalance lines determine the effective 
marginal cost of system flexibility. The “no-wind” and “perfect-forecast” lines overlap. 
 
c. Conclusion on effect of wind unpredictability on physical balancing 
Within the aim of this paper, more important than the actual numbers, which depend on assumptions and 
hypothetical data, are the qualitative effects that are observed. The physical impact on the gas network 
depends on the relative positions of the shippers. If both commit too much gas, the network buffer can become 
exhausted and the TSO has to turn to more expensive resources. Historic gas demand is well understood, 
making forecasting future demand easier. Residential demand, for instance, is temperature dependent, but 
rather than relying on the predicted temperature of just the next day, it is common practice in the gas industry 
to make heating-demand forecasts using an equivalent temperature that takes into account the predicted 
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average temperature for the next day as well as average-temperature data of previous days.6 By experience the 
shippers know the accuracy of that prediction method. The transfer of wind-power unpredictability and 
variability, on the other hand, is a new phenomenon. 
 
The actually available line-pack flexibility depends strongly on the starting conditions. Therefore, 
unpredictability makes system management harder. Furthermore, end-state limitations for the next-day 
contingency also affect the use of line-pack flexibility and whether or not more expensive flexible gas has to 
be dispatched. The balancing costs were observed to depend strongly on the starting conditions. Indeed, in 
many simulations the system was able to deal with the imbalances using just line-pack flexibility. It should be 
noted, however, that the TSO takes preemptive actions based on the unit commitment submitted by the 
shippers. These anticipatory actions can be contrary to what would have been done if all information had been 
correct, e.g., increasing the buffer because shippers are expected to go short intra-day when in real time the 
shippers have committed too much gas, further inflating the buffer. The TSO can only act on the same 
information as the shippers and is thus subject to erratic information. These situations, where the 
unpredictability and the low-quality information affect both the shipper and the TSO, are challenging the 
balancing of the network.  
 
Evidently, the identified dynamics have existed before the introduction of massive wind power. Indeed, in the 
no-wind scenario, it can be observed that line-pack flexibility covers the within-day variability of demand in 
the same way as the scenario with perfect forecasting of wind-power output. However, wind-power 
unpredictability that is transferred to the CCGT gas demand creates additional challenges for the gas-system 
balancing. Therefore, wind-power unpredictability has a strong impact on the physical balancing of the gas 
system and its flexibility tools. And this impact is likely to increase in the future. 
 
3.2 Organizing imbalance settlement: regulatory options 
Gas balancing occurs over a 24-hour interval in the EU and covers the actual gas dispatching. Balancing 
charges, then, are levied proportionally to the contribution of each individual shipper to the system imbalance. 
These balancing charges should be cost covering: either the total balancing costs or only the end-of-day costs 
that have been shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6. Balancing charges should also reflect actual costs and offer 
incentives to balance ex ante. First, a non-market-based design is examined, followed by a market-based 
design. 
 
3.2.1 Non-market-based settlement 
In case of non-market-based settlement, shipper imbalances are typically settled against a price referring to 
the local or an adjacent spot market for gas. Additionally, a penalty term often provides an incentive for the 
shipper to balance ex ante. Appropriate penalty levels are derived below for an imposed TSO-cost-neutrality 
requirement with regard to balancing costs. Strictly speaking, a penalty is neither cost reflective nor meant to 
recover costs, even though it can “unintentionally” help recover costs. But in the context of the analysis of the 
present paper, the break-even penalties serve as mark-ups on the reference price to achieve cost neutrality. 
Thus, the TSO recovers the system-balancing costs from the unbalanced shippers and he defines a break-even 
mark-up on the reference price to achieve this goal. Balancing costs are discussed for different positions of 
the historic shipper, each time combined with the different forecast scenarios of the wind shipper.  
 
a. Historic shipper: short imbalance position 
Table 6 shows the break-even penalties for the cases with a small deficit for the historic shipper. This break-
even penalty is calculated by dividing the applicable balancing cost (see Figure 5) by the imbalance basis and 
the reference gas price. This imbalance basis, then, is the sum of the absolute values of the individual shipper 
imbalances. It has been explained before that settlement mechanisms often do not make a distinction between 
 
6
 This equivalent temperature is further linked to the degree-day concept that is frequently used in the heating sector as a 
measure for heating-services demand. The number of (equivalent) degree days is then obtained by subtracting the 
equivalent temperature from the predefined base temperature above which no heating is expected.  
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those who instigate the system imbalance and those who help the system with an opposite mitigating 
imbalance position. Therefore, both have to contribute to the recovery of the TSO’s balancing costs. 
 
Table 6. Non-market-based imbalance tariffs: break-even penalty (expressed as a percentage of the 
reference gas price) to achieve cost neutrality with regard to the total balancing costs or only the end-
of-day costs for the case of the short historic shipper 
 
Perfect 
forecast 
Small 
error 
Over-
estimation 
Under-
estimation No wind 
Total 
balancing cost 
14.7% 13.9% 11.9% 4.75% 17% 
End-of-day 
cost 
4% 4% 7.73% 1.01% 4% 
 
Intra-day costs are often socialized in the transmission tariff for all gas-network users. If that is the case, only 
the end-of-day balancing costs have to be recovered by means of the break-even penalty (second line in Table 
6). The cost-neutral end-of-day penalties range between 1 percent and about 8 percent and are thus fairly low. 
If intra-day costs are not socialized, on the other hand, and all balancing costs have to be covered by a break-
even penalty, this total penalty becomes two to four times as high as the end-of-day penalties, ranging from 
almost 5 percent till over 15 percent (first line in Table 6). A closer examination of the forecast scenarios 
reveals low penalty levels in the underestimation case. These particular levels are explained by the opposite 
imbalance positions of the historic shipper, who mitigates the system imbalance, and the wind shipper, who 
instigates the system imbalance. Their opposing positions reduce the aggregated system imbalance and lower 
balancing costs, on the one hand, and the imbalance basis is large because both shippers have an end-of-day 
imbalance, on the other hand. So, lower costs are divided over a larger imbalance basis; thus, requiring a 
small break-even penalty.  
 
In the perfect-forecast and no-wind scenarios, the break-even penalties to recover total balancing costs are 
high compared to the scenarios with forecast errors. These high penalties indicate another problem of 
settlement design: in both scenarios the CCGT demand is perfectly predictable and the wind shipper balances 
over the day, resulting in an imbalance basis of zero. In other words, all balancing costs – including the intra-
day costs caused by the wind shipper – are to be recovered from the historic shipper.  
 
b. Historic shipper: long imbalance position 
Table 7 summarizes the break-even penalties for the examined forecast scenarios if the historic shipper has 
committed too much gas. The interpretation of the penalties is similar to that made in the preceding 
subsection: the first line of Table 7 represents mark-ups to pass on all balancing costs to unbalanced shippers, 
whereas the end-of-day penalties recover only the end-of-day costs while the intra-day costs are socialized. 
 
Table 7. Non-market-based imbalance tariffs: break-even penalty (expressed as a percentage of the 
reference gas price) to achieve cost neutrality with regard to the total balancing costs or only the end-
of-day costs for the case of the long historic shipper 
 
Perfect 
forecast 
Small 
error 
Over-
estimation 
Under-
estimation No wind 
Total 
balancing cost 
12.5% 11.7% 6% 15.7% 15.4% 
End-of-day 
cost 
4% 3.51% 0.8% 12.8% 4% 
 
End-of-day penalties range from below 1 percent to over 12 percent depending on the forecast scenario. The 
mark-ups that cover all balancing costs vary from 6 percent to almost 16 percent. This spread is again 
explained by the dynamics of the imbalance basis and the actual balancing costs. E.g., in the underestimation 
scenario, both shippers instigate the system imbalance. Even though the imbalance basis is large, the 
dispatching of expensive flexibility (Table 5) increases balancing costs to such a degree that the end-of-day 
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and the total break-even penalties become high compared to the respective penalties in the other forecast 
scenarios. The overestimation case in Table 7 is similar to the underestimation case in Table 6: both shippers 
have opposing and non-zero imbalances reducing balancing costs while both shippers are contributing to the 
recovery of those costs.  
 
c. Conclusion on effect of wind unpredictability on non-market-based settlement 
The difficulty in determining a proper break-even mark-up for non-market-based balancing mechanisms 
consists in ensuring the mark-up is high enough to pass on either the end-of-day costs, if intra-day costs are 
socialized, or the total balancing costs, if all costs are allocated to the unbalanced shippers. Yet, these 
balancing costs depend on unpredictable system imbalances. Thus, the a-priori determination of a mark-up 
that recovers and reflects costs is nearly impossible.7 The varying penalties for the different forecast cases in, 
e.g., Table 6 illustrate this statement: in some scenarios a 1-percent mark-up is sufficient, whereas in other, 
equally likely cases a 7-percent mark-up is required to cover end-of-day costs. 
 
Slightly overshooting the break-even level, though, can still be justified in order to provide balancing 
incentives to shippers. Indeed, cost-neutral penalties are not efficient in providing incentives. However, in 
current settlement mechanisms the single penalty level is fixed and independent of the actually used 
flexibility. More-unpredictable gas demand will result in more occurrences of the low-quality-forecast cases, 
leading to inappropriate penalty levels burdening shippers or failing to recover balancing costs.  
A risk-averse system operator might be tempted to overshoot the break-even penalty rather than end up with 
an inadequately low mark-up. This might be the case for Belgium, where penalty levels of 40 percent of the 
reference price and higher are charged. Either the actual costs of system flexibility are very high, perhaps 
including some kind of (pipeline) capacity cost, or the penalty just serves as deterrence for shippers. Either 
way, the Belgian (and other countries’) penalties are not transparent. For the shipper, on the other hand, a 
fixed penalty allows an easy comparison of the ex-post exposure to imbalance charges to the costs of ex-ante 
flexibility. 
 
3.2.2 Market-based settlement 
However, European TSOs are changing their settlement-mechanism design toward market-based settlement. 
This settlement mechanism implies that market dynamics determines the price of flexible gas. A merit-order 
curve for flexible gas offered to the TSO, e.g., Figure 4 or Figure 7, can be used for balancing and to derive 
imbalance tariffs from. The flexible gas is then acquired from balancing-services providers (in the framework 
of this chapter, it is irrelevant whether this is the TSO or other, competitive flexibility providers) who have to 
be paid an appropriate fee. The TSO, then, has multiple options to charge unbalanced shippers. One option 
consists of charging the average cost of these services. This is equivalent with the outcome of the cost-neutral 
penalties determined in the preceding section. Or, as a second option, the charges can be linked to the cost of 
the marginal unit of either upward or downward balancing energy.8 Marginal-cost pricing of imbalances can 
result in profits for the TSO, but it can be more efficient as it provides better incentives to both the shippers 
and the TSO regarding flexibility needs. In the following subsections, this marginal-cost pricing is used as the 
pricing rule for ex-post balancing. 
 
a. Historic shipper: short imbalance position 
Table 8 summarizes the results of market-based settlement for the cases where the historic shipper is short. 
The upper two rows in Table 8 report the cost contributions (EUR) of the wind shipper and the historic 
 
7
 It can be argued that cost recovery should not be accomplished on this very short term, but can be achieved, e.g., by 
charging a lump sum tariff (or tariff reduction) to all network users independent of the amount of used flexibility. 
However, such a lump sum fails to allocate costs to those causing them. Therefore, cost neutrality of the TSO should be 
achieved as close as possible to the balancing period because otherwise the link between cause (imbalance) and 
consequence (costs), or in other words, cost reflection is lost.  
8
 Tariffs can be derived from the balancing merit-order curve in many different ways; the examples presented here are just 
two options that contain the principles of a market-based tariff. 
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shipper, respectively.9 The final two rows in Table 8, then, display the degree of balancing-cost recovery (%) 
by the market-based charges, both with respect to the total balancing cost and the end-of-day cost. This 
degree, thus, indicates to what extent the balancing costs are passed on to the unbalanced shippers. 
 
Table 8. Market-based imbalance tariffs (historic shipper has deficit): individual shipper contribution in 
terms of net balancing charges (EUR) and degree of balancing-cost recovery (%) of total market-based 
balancing charges 
Cost contribution [EUR] 
and cost coverage [%] 
Perfect 
forecast Small error 
Over-
estimation 
Under-
estimation No wind 
Wind shipper EUR 0 EUR 58.7 EUR 6936.3 EUR 1520.7 EUR 0 
Historic shipper EUR 909.8 EUR 909.8 EUR 4549.2 EUR 909.8 EUR 909.8 
      
End-of-day cost 100% 100% 259% 398% 100% 
Total balancing cost 27% 29% 168% 84% 24% 
 
Compared to the single penalty of a non-market-based mechanism, marginal-cost-based imbalance tariffs 
ensure full recovery of at least the end-of-day costs associated with unpredictability in all cases: cost coverage 
is 100 percent or above (third line in Table 8). Furthermore, the unbalanced shippers receive clear signals 
with reference to the cost of ex-post balancing: they pay substantially higher imbalance charges if the 
marginal cost of flexibility increases. This is the case for the overestimation scenario. Indeed, both short 
shippers are cashed out at the higher marginal cost of dispatched upward flexibility from storage (Table 4): 
the historic shipper pays about 4500 and the wind shipper almost 7000. For both shippers this amount is much 
more than the amount they pay in the other forecasts scenarios in which no expensive flexibility has been 
dispatched. The TSO even makes a profit as evidenced by the degree of cost coverage that is well above 100 
percent for both recovery of end-of-day costs and recovery of total balancing costs. This profit can be used for 
the benefit of all network users by making investments in flexibility or by reducing the general transport 
tariffs that cover intra-day flexibility.  
In the underestimation case, end-of-day unpredictability costs are also more than covered (398%), but the 
short historic shipper ends up paying for a system imbalance that he actually helped mitigate. If shippers are 
allowed to pool individual imbalances ex post, they can cooperate to reduce their exposure to balancing 
charges. For the TSO, on the other hand, such pooling would reduce the imbalance basis from which 
balancing costs can be recovered.  
 
b. Historic shipper: long imbalance position 
Table 9 reports the imbalance charges for the historic shipper and the wind shipper, and the degree of cost 
recovery of end-of-day costs and total costs for the case of a long historic shipper. The shippers face the 
higher marginal cost of dispatched storage flexibility (Table 5) if they are both long. Again, efficient prices 
are charged to the unbalanced shippers and these prices cover at least the end-of-day imbalances. In some 
scenarios, also the total balancing cost is covered by the market-based charges, but this is not a structural 
result. 
 
9
 Note that these values are costs for just 24 hours of balancing and that the comparison of the values between different 
forecast-cases is more important than the exact numbers.  
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Table 9. Market-based imbalance tariffs (historic shipper has surplus): individual shipper contribution in 
terms of net balancing charges (EUR) and degree of balancing-cost recovery (%) of total market-based 
balancing charges 
Cost contribution [EUR] 
and cost coverage [%] 
Perfect 
forecast Small error 
Over-
estimation 
Under-
estimation No wind 
Wind shipper EUR 0 EUR 58.7 EUR 1387.3 EUR 7603.4 EUR 0 
Historic shipper EUR 909.8 EUR 909.8 EUR 909.8 EUR 4549.2 EUR 909.8 
      
End-of-day cost 100% 114% 481% 156% 100% 
Total balancing cost 32% 34% 66% 127% 26% 
 
c. Conclusion on effect of wind unpredictability on market-based settlement 
If unpredictability increases, all shippers instigating larger system imbalances end up paying the high 
marginal cost of more expensive flexible gas; even if a shipper’s contribution is limited. In the overestimation 
case of Table 8, the historic shipper’s share of the system imbalance is about 33 percent and he pays about 
4500 euro. But, if the wind shipper had avoided his massive forecasting error, the historic shipper would have 
paid about four times less as evidenced by the charges due by the historic shipper for the perfect-forecast and 
the overestimation case in Table 8.  
Therefore, shippers with small imbalance positions of the same sign as the imbalances of dominant shippers 
dealing with massive unpredictability, such as gas demand related to intermittent wind power, are penalized 
by marginal-cost-based balancing because the small shipper pays a higher cost. And this cost is actually 
caused by the dominant shipper. The actions of such dominant shippers affect the price of flexibility and the 
assumption of price-taking shippers no longer holds.  
Another peculiarity that has been observed in some simulations is the dispatching of expensive upward intra-
day flexibility when the end-of-day imbalances of the system and the shippers were all positive. In that case, 
the shippers would only pay the marginal cost of downward flexibility instead of the expensive upward 
flexibility. This anomaly is dependent on the design of the settlement mechanism and can be remedied by 
making a distinction between those instigating and those mitigating the system imbalance at the time of the 
dispatching of expensive flexibility, or by reducing the balancing interval (e.g. hourly or every quarter-day) to 
better allocate costs. 
 
4. Summary and conclusions 
This paper has studied the possible implications of the transfer of wind-intermittency into the gas system. This 
organizational and regulatory challenge of interacting energy systems seems to be somewhat overlooked as 
evidenced by the limited availability of academic and industry literature on the topic. Yet, it is important for 
policy makers and regulators to be aware of transferred externalities, to be able to design adequate rules for 
both the electricity and gas system, which will interact more and more in the next decades.  
 
This impact of unpredictability of RES on gas balancing has been investigated by applying the electricity-
generation concepts of “unit commitment”, “power dispatching” and “forecasting error” to the gas balancing 
problem and using operations research to simulate the optimal operation of a gas system. Physically, the 
network flexibility and flexible gas need to cover potentially very large deviations of several percent of the 
(scaled) demand due to forecast errors in the commitment phase compared to the actual dispatching of gas. 
System flexibility has to cover this imbalance, with increasing unpredictability leading to the dispatch of more 
expensive flexible gas to cover the physical swing. Therefore, unpredictability raises the costs of system 
balancing. These results confirm earlier findings in the literature.  
 
The organizational impact regarding the financial settlement of imbalances and the allocation of costs is 
closely related to the increased physical swing: large prediction errors cause large gas-system imbalances, 
requiring more expensive flexible gas in a market-based-balancing framework. Such a balancing mechanism 
provides clear incentives to balance the system ex ante because the more unbalanced the system, the less 
favorable the ex-post balancing charges become. The downside of this mechanism is a risk that massive 
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uncontrollable and unpredictable wind increases gas-system imbalances and thus deteriorates the balancing 
conditions for all other users, who cannot be held responsible for the gas matching problems of the wind 
shipper. Indeed, as has been demonstrated in the analysis of this paper, dominant shippers with an 
unpredictable portfolio could become price setters instead of price takers. Hence, market-based settlement in a 
gas market with large shippers with unpredictable portfolios leads to higher costs for other network users who 
are not or less responsible for these costs. 
 
The simulations have further demonstrated that a non-market-based settlement, which is currently the main 
design in Europe, is not really affected by the transfer of unpredictability because this kind of system is to a 
large extent independent of gas-balancing dynamics.10 Yet, the main difficulty consists of determining an 
appropriate fixed penalty that results in passing on balancing costs and at the same time does not harm 
shippers by being excessive. Indeed, cost-neutral recovery of costs would require the penalty to change 
frequently, whereas this penalty is actually defined within the balancing rules beforehand. 
 
Furthermore, both organizational designs of settlement fail to recover the full cost of balancing, meaning the 
costs associated with intra-day and end-of-day imbalances. Indeed, the intra-day costs are absorbed by the 
TSO and socialized by means of the general transport tariffs, confirming the findings of [11]. Better and more 
efficient cost allocation is achieved if shorter balancing intervals are used. To summarize, from a regulatory 
point of view, it is clear that the gas system is impacted by the transfer of intermittency. This has been 
demonstrated in this paper with regard to the physical balancing of the gas system specifically focusing on the 
settlement of imbalances afterwards.  
 
The analysis presented here is an a posteriori study of the impact of wind power on gas. Other methods 
should be applied to make an a priori assessment taking into account interactions between the gas actors, 
especially in the market-based case. This would require another class of models: equilibrium modeling. 
Evidently, real balancing designs are substantially more complex and try to remedy some of the fallacies of 
simple designs, but the main findings are general enough to hold because complex designs still use the basic 
building blocks. For instance, the addition of ex-ante flexibility would allow the shipper to modulate demand 
and reduce imbalances, but prediction errors would still be present on a very short term. 
Furthermore, the study in this paper is the first to explicitly associate the challenges of designing gas-
balancing mechanisms to the issue of wind-power integration, or more in general, increasing unpredictability 
of gas demand. It provides a first step in a field where further research is needed to streamline the operation of 
future closely interconnected electricity-and-gas systems. Actual case studies will provide further insight in 
the size of the effects transferred from electricity to gas. These are subject of further research. 
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Appendix: technical gas-network data 
 
Table 10. Nodal information for network of Figure 3: nodal-pressure limits, presence of compression 
and the maximal compression ratio and function of node in network 
Node Pressure limits 
(low/high) 
[bar] 
Compression 
(y/n) 
Function: demand (D), supply 
(S), transit (T), upward 
flexibility (F+) or downward 
flexibility (F-) 
Supply A 60 / 80 n S 
Supply B 60 / 80 n S 
CCGT1 60 / 80 n D 
CCGT2 60 / 80 n D 
CCGT3 60 / 80 n D 
CCGT4 60 / 80 n D 
Industry 60 / 80 n D 
Storage 60 / 80 n F+/F- 
 
Table 11. Pipelines of Figure 3: diameter D, distance L and range of starting average pressures p̄a(ij),start 
to determine line pack 
Pipeline D [m] L [km] p̄a(ij),start [bar]a 
Supply A – CCGT1 0.7 30 62 - 70 
Supply A – CCGT2 0.7 30 62 - 70 
CCGT2 - Storage 0.7 7.5 62 - 70 
CCGT2 – Industry 0.7 15 62 - 70 
Industry – CCGT3 0.7 15 62 - 70 
CCGT3 – CCGT4 0.7 30 62 - 70 
Supply B – CCGT3 0.7 30 62 - 70 
a
 a range of starting average pressures is tested, the reported cases use 62.5 bar (short 
historic shipper) and 70 bar (long historic) shipper 
 
Table 12. Storage details for network of Figure 3: base gas that remains in storage, working-gas 
capacity that can be filled and emptied and injection and withdrawal limits 
Node Base gas 
[M.m3] 
Working gas 
[M.m3] 
Injection limit 
[M.m3/h] 
Withdrawal 
limit [M.m3/h] 
Storage 39 117 0.85 1.1 
 
